Hi,
I’m the VaeVictis’s reviewer. First, thanks for replying to my remarks and thanks to have produced a good set of rules. However, I maintain my remarks and I would like to explain them thereafter. I've tried to mention my sources.
1) Ranges for artillery are too short:
Obviously, I’ve read your text about that on page 45. The problem is that the artillery ranges are too short for canister and 12 pdr. I calculated the terrain scale with one 600 men medium battalion (4 bases) and two feet by man. Thus, we have a round 30BW for 1000 yards.
Normally, the 12 pdr send canister up to 500 yards (15BW); 6 pdr up to 400 yards (12BW) and 3 pdr up to 300 yards (9BW). That’s respectively 5BW, 4BW and 3BW more than the rules (+50% in each case).
The “right” long range is more difficult to find because it depends of the nationality of the guns. For example, the Artillery Equipments of the Napoleonic Wars (Osprey MaA 96) gives only 700 yards for the effective range of the Austrian 12 pdr, but 700-900 yards for Russian and 900 for Prussian and French guns. The more recent Osprey New Vanguard about Austrian artillery gives an effective range of 760-885 meters (830-970 yards) for the same Austrian guns. General Gassendi wrote in his manual for French artillery’s officers that the ranges for the 12, 8 and 4 pdr were respectively 900, 800 and 700 meters (980/870/760 yards). In Lasalle, the maximum ranges for heavy/medium/light guns are 22/20/18BW (730/670/600 yards): the range for the heavy guns is too short.
2) No regimental guns:
Your answer is very surprising.
Detailed tactical accounts of fights in the napoleonic era are very scarce. Thus, it’s difficult to conclude that regimental guns aren’t efficient as you did. Anyway, you added a rule for rockets that were non-efficient and rarer than the regimental guns, so why no rule for regimental guns?
You “couldn't find a single historian who argued that they were worth anything”, but Napoleon himself stated in a letter to general Clarke, on May 29th 1809 (#1142, tome sixième, Correspondance militaire de Napoléon Ier, Editions Plon, Paris, 1876): “Tous les jours, je me convaincs du grand mal qu’on a fait à nos armées en ôtant les pièces de régiment” [quick translation: “Every day, I’m convinced of the great wrongs done to our armies by removing the regimental guns”]. And one historian — the chef d’escadron Buat — explains in his superb job about the last part of the 1809 campaign why Napoleon chose to create regimental guns: “À Essling, Napoléon avait été frappé des ravages que l’artillerie autrichienne, très supérieure à la nôtre, avait fait dans nos rangs : il était convaincu d’autre part que les jeunes troupes dont son armée était en grande partie composée, et dont la proportion allait devenir plus forte encore, avaient un urgent besoin d’être soutenues matériellement et moralement par une artillerie de plus en plus puissante” (page 27 of the second volume of De Ratisbonne à Znaim. La campagne de 1809 en Autriche, Paris, Chapelot, 1909) [“At Essling, Napoleon had been stunned by the devastation that the Austrian artillery, much numerous than ours, did in our ranks: he was convinced on the other hand that the young troops of which his army was composed to a great extent, and of which the proportion would be even higher, had an urgent need to be physically and morally supported by a more powerful artillery”].
Thus, on May 25th 1809, Napoleon ordered the creation of regimental guns mainly to boost the moral of his conscripts. He ordered the general Songis (#1142, tome sixième, Correspondance militaire, etc.) to add a total of 78 regimental guns to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th corps. Only 66 guns (17 for Oudinot, 32 for Davout and 17 for Masséna) were ready for the battle of Wagram (page 29 of the second volume of De Ratisbonne à Znaim). I’m sure that these regimental guns were used at Wagram because Napoleon wrote in his “Ordres généraux pour le passage du Danube” (#1167, tome sixième, Correspondance militaire, etc.): “Le 5 [juillet] à la pointe du jour, toutes les divisions seront sous les armes, chacune avec son artillerie, l’artillerie de régiment dans l’intervalle des bataillons” [“On the 5th (of July) at daybreak, all divisions will be under arms, each with its artillery, the regimental guns between the battalions”]. On July 15th, 1809, he also wrote to Clarke (#1170, tome sixième, Correspondance militaire, etc.): “Mon intention est de compléter l’artillerie des régiments” [“My intention is to supplement the regimental guns”].
Moreover, your assumptions about the Russian campaign are not correct. Most of the regimental guns were at Borodino. I have a precise OOB from the SHAT (Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, archives of the French Army) and, on September 2nd, 1812, only five days before Borodino, 147 guns were still available for the 1st corps (Davout). This corps began the campaign with 150 guns (64 regimental guns + 70 divisional guns + 16 reserve guns). At this time, 75 of the 86 guns of the 3rd corps (Ney) were still present. Unfortunately, the numbers of guns for the 4th and 5th corps are unreadable, but it’s likely that the men of this two corps had kept their guns as much as possible, as they were considered as trophies: there were as precious as eagles.
The main difference between French and other armies is that Austrians and Russians replaced regimental guns by divisional guns, because batteries of guns were more efficient than sections of two guns all along the front of the army. French approach was different as regimental guns were added to the existent divisional guns. That’s perhaps the reason why these light guns were efficient in the French army: they never replaced the divisional guns, but were a kind of “bonus”.
Thus, many regimental guns were present at two major napoleonic battles (i.e. Wagram and Borodino) and at least at all fights in July and August 1812. And that’s why I think that a tactical napoleonic rule must include regimental guns. As the fire of one eight-guns battery is equivalent to the fire of a battalion, it means that the “free” (i.e. captured) light guns were worth the effect of eight to twenty battalions (for firing). In fact, I am convinced that if Napoleon had established regimental guns, that’s because they were useful. And I’m sure that if these regimental guns had not been efficient, the Emperor would have not hesitated to remove them from his army.
Finally, you recommended in Lasalle (page 2) Rory Muir’s Tactics and the Experience of Battle in the Age of Napoleon (Yale University Press, 2000) and this author wrote “Close support from artillery often brought psychological advantages out of all proportion to its material effects, and this is one of the principal arguments for the retention of the battalion guns” (page 212).
3) No moral test for a unit if another unit routs or a general is killed:
As already stated, this kind of tactical details were usually omitted in after action reports, thus it’s very difficult to have some certitudes.
However, I’ve read some years ago the “mémoires” of Poirier de Beauvais, the commandant of the Vendean artillery, during the uprising of 1793 (published by Les Édition du Bocage,1994). He noted some instances where the Vendeans panicked:
- July 3rd, 1793, some troops routed because they saw a retrograde movement of their own guns (page 63);
- about twelve days later, same problem (page 74): the Vendeans on the left wing panicked because they mistaken a movement of their own cavalry for a movement of enemy cavalry… There was a propagation of the panic and all the army fell back;
- Poirier wrote also: “Il n’est pas étonnant que des gens non accoutumés au feu, et se battant contre leur gré, ne soient pas fermes, surtout quand la troupe de ligne donne l’exemple de la retraite” (page 115) [“It is not surprising that people not accustomed to combat, and fighting against their will, are not firm, especially when the regulars gives the example of retreat”]. Well it seems that the view of “better” troops living the battlefield have an impact;
- and finally, “La vue de ces deux chefs mortellement atteints [i.e. Bonchamps and d’Elbée] anéantit nos soldats ; ils perdirent le feu qui les animait, et de cet état de stupeur passèrent bientôt à celui de la crainte ; l’armée, se trouvant dans une position fâcheuse, hésita un moment, et fut bientôt après complètement en déroute” (page 147) [“The sight of these two mortally wounded leaders (i.e. Bonchamps and d’Elbée) rendered our soldiers useless, they lost the spirit that animated them, and this state of stupor soon became fear; the army, being in an awkward position, hesitated a moment, and was soon almost completely routed”].
Another example seems to be the Cumberland hussars at Waterloo (The Waterloo Companion, Mark Adkin, Aurum Press, 2005): after the fall of la Haye-Sainte, they began to falter, refused to charge and fled the battlefield, without “things append to them” at this time.
Well, it seems that at least irregular or conscript troops with a low moral were prone to panic. If I find another such examples, especially for seasoned troops, I will complete this list.
4) Entrenching an unit in an open field during a battle:
“I'm not sure I understand this.... Perhaps a translation issue?”
As I understand the rule in page 75, a unit could be entrenched in the open during a battle (i.e. after the beginning of the battle). But the construction of entrenchments in the open was normally made before the battle starts. When I read Lasalle, it seems that some troops may react like Soviet infantry in WWII: they take some shovels and entrench themselves in the open during the course of a battle. This situation seems odd.
By the way, I have a remark about the assault bonus that gives an engineer base in Lasalle: engineers of the napoleonic era were not usually used like the German pioneers at Stalingrad. The “sapeurs” were to valuable to be wasted in direct assault, unless special (and very rare) circumstances.
5) Frontage of cavalry:
In any case, the frontage of a single infantryman and a single cavalryman were not the same. Usually, there were about three infantrymen vs two cavalrymen. Thus, there’re only two options if the aim is to have an “historical” frontage for Lasalle:
- if a small four-bases infantry unit represents around 600 men and a small cavalry unit represents 400 men, then the cavalry unit must have six bases;
- if both small units have four bases, then the cavalry unit must represent between 200 and 350 men only.
In fact, with a frontage narrower than in real life, the cavalry units can be moved more easily than expected on a Lasalle’s table.
Regards,
JPI