

Not Enough *Esprit* in the *Corps* The Failure of the Westphalian Army, 1807-13

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The Napoleonic Kingdom of Westphalia has been largely neglected by English-language historical scholarship. The Westphalian state and its civic life receive occasional mention in monographic studies of the broader German experience under Napoleon.¹ But there has been no scholarly study of the Westphalian military in English. Its structure and performance generally receive limited attention only as components of larger campaign studies or battle narratives.² In German scholarship, the opposite has been true. The Napoleonic bicentennials have encouraged a recent spate of scholarly writing, supplementing the small extant corpus of monographs over the past three decades, but all of this work has focused on the civic life of Westphalia, not the kingdom's military.³

The performance of the Westphalian military during the Napoleonic Wars was – to put it charitably – “mixed.” In a few cases Westphalian units performed with a skill similar to that of their French mentors. But in many other cases Westphalian troops showed themselves to be unenthusiastic, unreliable, and incompetent. In a study of this length it is impossible to provide a comprehensive survey of all units, campaigns, and battles, even for a relatively small army. Thus this article makes no claim to be an indisputable statistical sampling. By drawing upon several examples, particularly those cited by the French and the Westphalians themselves, this article will explore the question of whether the Westphalian military failed to evolve into a solid and cohesive force with a sense of national identity and purpose. It is this author's view that the question of *loyalty*, which haunted Westphalian officials in both the civil and military administration, illuminates the fundamental weakness of this most fragile of Napoleonic satellites.

A Foreign Presence

Napoleon created the Kingdom of Westphalia by amalgamating the territories of nearly two dozen German states. A majority of the people had originally been subjects of Prussia, Brunswick, Hannover, or the Hessian principalities. In many ways, Westphalia was to be the centerpiece of the new Confederation of the Rhine, and a showcase of the new, Napoleonic Germany. Unlike the other major components of the Confederation, Westphalia was the only large German state that did not represent an extant, longstanding German dynasty.

The Emperor appointed his 23-year-old brother Jerome as king and arranged Jerome's marriage to Princess Catherine of Württemberg. The new kingdom's design, however, was entirely Napoleon's, and the early administration overwhelmingly French. Napoleon gave Jerome Westphalia's constitution with a stern reminder that it was a reflection of the emperor's own “glory.”⁴ He monitored Jerome's correspondence and micro-managed his diplomacy. He frequently vetoed Jerome's picks for administrators, or intervened to change them. Westphalian newspapers were closely monitored by French

authorities, at Napoleon's direct instructions. One Westphalian nobleman commented that, "the Emperor considers the kingdom not to be a sovereign state but rather an extension of France."⁵

For a state located in the heartland of central Germany, there was rather little about Westphalia that was consciously *German*. Wilhelm Ludwig Falkmann, an officer in Lippe's contingent of the Rheinbund who passed through Kassel in April 1809, observed that, "You would think you had entered a French city; so completely had they altered it."⁶ Virtually all official business was done in French. The royal administration and all ministries kept records in French. The postal system required the names of persons and localities to be written in the French spellings. The official seals of all the royal departments, and their letterheads, were in French. All legal documents, statements, and testimony had to be translated into French in order to be admissible in a court of law.⁷ In a country where 100% of the population were German speakers, Westphalian proclamations were almost always bilingual, with the French text printed in the left column of each page, and the German on the right.

In the areas to comprise the new kingdom, Napoleon seized more than half of all the land owned by German nobility and gave it to French officers or officials. The plunder and dislocation that attended the kingdom's creation boded ill for future loyalty to the state. In Kassel Napoleon's art commissioners confiscated dozens of masterpieces from the *Gemäldegalerie* and the *Museum Fridericianum*. In Braunschweig the French cleaned out both private and public treasuries, down to the contribution funds in the churches, taking nearly every horse in the region and then presenting the citizens with the bill for the "expenses" of maintaining them.⁸ Teenaged Carl Friedrich von Vechelde watched the townsfolk handing over food and fodder to the French occupiers in 1806-07, and after the city passed to Westphalian rule he watched his mother struggle as the family's land was seized and their patent of nobility nullified by Jerome's government. The young Vechelde grew up with adventurous stories of the "Black Duke" of Brunswick, who like him had lost his father during the wars against Napoleon. Like many other families, the Vecheldes became fierce partisans for the Old Regime.⁹

Nor were these grievances limited to the aristocracy. Braunschweigers, despite cheering an initial visit by Queen Catherine in May 1808, soon came to resent Napoleon's demand for war "contributions," combined with the plundering of public buildings, the quartering of soldiers, and the economic distresses of the Continental System. One group took down the Westphalian national insignia from a tollhouse and dragged it through the street. Another obtained a Westphalian military flag, dyed it with black ink, and flew it like a pirate's jack. Many people dressed in "Oels-Fashion," wearing black clothing to show solidarity with their exiled young Duke. College students composed a new patriotic song in the "Black Duke's" honor, and marched through the streets singing it, as if on parade.¹⁰

Napoleon seemed well aware of the tenuous nature of his youngest brother's kingdom. In a letter to Jerome in December 1807, the emperor mused on possible choices for Westphalian ambassadors: "But whom to send. A German? *You do not have any devoted enough.*"¹¹ Staffing the ministries with Frenchman was a tacit admission that there were, as yet, no actual "Westphalians."

Westphalia therefore came into the world already fraught with problems of loyalty: a foreign king; an imported foreign aristocracy with shaky claims on the land; an angry

native former-aristocracy with good reason to plot against the status-quo; a foreign language used in the administration of public affairs; and the burdens of imperial service: higher taxes, a greater likelihood of military conscription, and shortages and inflation caused by the blockade. To this already long list of problems we must add the conflicts resulting from the imposition of new laws and customs brought from France.

Many historians indulge in teleology when writing of the Napoleonic conquest of Europe, emphasizing *modernization* as a benefit brought from the Revolution to these Old Regime states. Conventional wisdom, particularly among American writers, holds that streamlining and secularization of government and institutions was a clearly-recognizable benefit of French hegemony. There may indeed have been tangible benefits for religious or ethnic minorities in various regions reorganized by Napoleonic France. However, there is very little evidence that anything like a *majority* of people at the time liked these changes, or particularly that they liked having them imposed with force by foreigners.

Popularity is an option for hereditary monarchs; it is not necessary. The regime's legitimacy rests upon other, much less tenuous foundations. Indeed, the very word "popular" in the 18-19th centuries implied a sort of dangerous pandering to the fickle mob. But for a very new state, with an ephemeral young monarch, a radically new constitution, and no national traditions, lacking also popularity constitutes a structural flaw. Moreover, the French Revolution had introduced the notion that State, Regime, and Nation might all be linked as a single loyalty — superseding religious or regional differences — for a body of citizens made equal under the law. This was supposed to have been one of the fundamental changes brought by Napoleonic France and imported into Westphalia. Thus, unlike a traditional German state, in which loyalty to the regime or dynasty might be overlaid or conditioned by various sectarian, traditional, or cultural issues, in Westphalia everyone was now simply a "citizen," and loyalty to state and regime had become one and the same. Since we are concerned ultimately with military performance, in a state which depended upon conscription for its ranks and enticements for its officers, the popularity of the regime bears directly upon the *esprit du corps* of the forces in the field.

1807-1809: Westphalia's Army Tested, And Failed

The Westphalian military, originally envisioned by Napoleon to number 25,000, was initially commanded by French officers and in some cases its ranks were filled with French troops. By early 1809 about half the projected figure had been raised, although the cadres for the Guard, many of the officers, and all the military police, were French. Indeed, Napoleon advised Jerome not to rush, and he counted the French garrison of Magdeburg, paid by the locals, as part of the "Westphalian" contingent until such time as his younger sibling could complete his own army. This, however, as we shall see, was a charade; the French in Jerome's country were not under Westphalian command at all, and indeed more often than not the opposite was true.

Hanover, the Hessian duchies, and Braunschweig all had long mercenary traditions (albeit usually in British service), and Napoleon did not expect much difficulty raising soldiers from these regions. Nonetheless by 1808 only half the soldiers were "volunteers," supplemented by some German-speaking French citizens from the Rhineland, and finally, local conscripts. Westphalian law required conscription, in part as

a means of preventing the common fraud of men who collected bounties for volunteering, then deserted, switched identities, and did it again and again. All men aged 20-25 were liable for service. But the process was both slow and unsteady.

John Gill has vividly described many of the problems in the early days of this army. The 1st Light infantry battalion, a collection of ne'er-do-wells captured from the Prussians after Jena, could not be trusted in the capital and was sent to Paderborn where they would not molest the king's subjects under his very nose.¹² The 1st Cheveauxlegers were likewise notoriously ill-disciplined. They were sent off to Spain, where standards of behavior between army and civilians were notably looser, and they managed to acquit themselves respectably. The Westphalian Guards proved no better than their compatriots in the line regiments when given the opportunity to plunder the inhabitants of Saxony in the Summer of 1809. Other Westphalian infantry escorting prisoners of war passed through Prussian territory in September 1809 and left such a swath of looting and abuse in their wake that the furious citizens took to arms and actually occasioned some fighting (during which several of the poorly-guarded prisoners escaped), before Prussian regular units showed up to restore order.¹³

At the beginning of 1809 the Westphalian army — a little over one year old — comprised four infantry regiments, a battalion of light infantry, two regiments of cavalry, four companies of artillery, and a collection of guard units. Two more infantry regiments were still forming. Of the four that were ready, three went to Spain, along with about half of the cavalry and artillery. Thus nearly three-quarters of the Westphalian troops received their first test at the grueling siege of Gerona, where they arrived at the beginning of May. The remainder of the army, at home in Westphalia, was simultaneously and very unexpectedly tested by a series of revolts and rebellions between April and July.

Several of the crises Westphalia faced in 1809 had some connection to the Prussian reform movements, who were by 1808 pursuing a new project of promoting pan-German national identity. This initiative stemmed largely from the ideas of the Baron vom Stein, who had revived the quasi-Masonic *Tugendbund* ("league of virtue") and transformed it into a nexus of anti-Bonapartist conspiracy. Stein used the *Tugendbund* as a means of channeling communication between the various secret and semi-secret fraternities that were springing up across northern Germany, in which men swore oaths of vengeance against the French.¹⁴ Thus the Prussians, who had been shorn of nearly all their non-German land and subjects, now began a more subtle offensive of national-identity politics, with an eye ultimately toward fomenting revolt in Napoleon's Germanic satellite states. The level of enthusiasm for these concepts varied considerably within the Prussian hierarchy, and the whole program made King Frederick William III extremely nervous, but by 1809 the *Tugendbund* had become a veritable Who's-Who of Prussian military and civilian leadership, as well as literati.

The *Tugendbund* had a particular interest in Westphalia: the only German regime that could be overthrown without damaging a long-standing German dynasty. Within Jerome's army could be found officers with conflicted loyalties (and indeed, many members of the *Tugendbund*), and soldiers who were certainly less than enthusiastic. If Westphalia collapsed, particularly while Napoleon's forces were tied down in Spain and/or against Austria, it might serve as the first domino falling among German princes to re-think their loyalties to the Bonaparte system. Thus by 1809 much of the *Tugendbund* leadership had chosen Westphalia as the target for the insurrection. Dozens

of small-town mayors and other local officials were in regular correspondence with Prussian conspirators. When the Austrians launched their offensives in early Spring, several of the *Tugendbund* plans began to unfold.

In three cases — peasant uprisings led by a handful of military or ex-military men — Jerome's forces were more than adequate to disperse the disorganized and hastily-assembled rebels.¹⁵ A few other uprisings sputtered out on their own, dissuaded by bad news or threats of force. And the *Tugendbund's* initial foray into Westphalia was an embarrassing disaster. This was the revolt of Captain Friedrich von Katte who in early April gathered a group of 300 rebels, led by former Prussian officers like himself who were now Westphalian subjects.¹⁶ Although they were mostly Westphalians, they had begun their march from Spandau, and Katte himself had been in Berlin the previous week, probably meeting with several co-conspirators. The Katte rebels crossed the Elbe and entered Stendal, seizing a paychest with 14,000 thaler from a handful of surprised Westphalian militia. Katte then received instructions from his Berlin conspirators to call off the revolt and return at once because their secrecy had been compromised and the Westphalians informed. The rebels scattered. Katte returned to Prussia where he was arrested, but most of his other officers fled ultimately to British custody, where they volunteered for service in Spain. King Frederick William III sent a formal apology to Jerome for the intrusion, but denied any culpability.

After Katte's brief adventure, the Westphalians faced more troubling and dangerous revolts. One emanated from within Jerome's own Guard. Wilhelm von Dörnberg was a fifty-one-year-old veteran of both Hessian and Prussian service and an active *Tugendbund* member who had nonetheless accepted a commission in Jerome's Guard. As he rose to the rank of Colonel and took command of the Garde-Jäger battalion in early 1809, Dörnberg was also assembling a circle of plotters around him. As commander of a guard battalion, he had an excellent chance to overthrow the regime without a protracted campaign.

Dörnberg's revolt began on 21 April, when he was surprised to be summoned to Jerome's palace to strengthen the garrison against the recent peasant uprisings.¹⁷ Sensing the timing could not be better, Dörnberg issued his call to arms and raised two groups of rebels, north and south of Kassel. Units and portions of units from the Westphalian military deserted to join him, and others withdrew and tried to declare that they were "neutral."¹⁸ Sigismund Martin's armed peasants marched toward the capital while Dörnberg tried to win over the army and prevent Jerome from being reinforced. Altogether more than 5,000 rebels mobilized, and for one day at least, Jerome appeared to be in serious trouble. Word of Dörnberg's revolt touched off two more civilian uprisings elsewhere in Westphalia.

Then Dörnberg lost his cool. It is unclear whether or not he was betrayed by one of his own officers, but Dörnberg abruptly fled Kassel after two brief encounters with Westphalian and Polish troops, leaving three large rebel groups without a commander to coordinate their movements. By the end of the 23rd, each of the groups had collapsed after sharp encounters with smaller forces of Westphalian and French troops. The civilian uprisings were subsequently extinguished as well.¹⁹

As the rebellion sputtered out by the evening of 23 April, Jerome felt secure enough to make the dramatic gesture of "allowing" his officers to join it, if they had lost faith in him. He assembled his Guard officers and asked them to renew their oaths to him. All of

those present did so. This was, in fact, the third loyalty oath to Jerome for some of them (Dörnberg himself had already been through the ceremony twice), and it must have seemed that the new regime was a bit too insistent upon such re-assurances. But Jerome used the occasion to demonstrate the fealty of his officer corps, probably as much in fear of his brother's wrath as in fear of insurrection. The next morning he issued a proclamation assuring his subjects that the revolt was safely over and not very subtly reminding them that his authority was backed up by "the invincible Napoleon, your protector."²⁰

After less than a week, however, the *Tugendbund* dealt Jerome another blow. The Prussian Major Ferdinand von Schill, one of the few heroes from the disastrous 1806-07 war, and arguably Prussia's most celebrated cavalier in 1809, led his hussar regiment out of Berlin with the aim of raising a great North-German ethnic revolt against Bonaparte hegemony. Schill was a celebrity, indeed a household word in many places with images, souvenir trinkets, and popular songs about him in wide circulation. He had hundreds of enthusiastic disciples in Westphalia, several of whom were well-placed to foment insurrection in both the military and civilian administrations. Schill entered Westphalia from the South at the beginning of May, after having passed briefly through Saxony, and he immediately began recruiting volunteers and issuing proclamations as he headed North along the left bank of the Elbe.

As the Schill rebels approached Magdeburg, the fortress' French commander, General Claude Ignace Michaud, faced a difficult decision. He had at his disposal a substantial force of Westphalians: eight battalions of infantry, although six of them (comprising the new 5th and 6th regiments of the line) he considered too green to risk in battle.²¹ That left him the full-strength 1st Westphalian Infantry (over 1,400 men), one battalion of French infantry from the 22nd regiment of the line, and three companies of artillery (one French, two Westphalian.) With nearly six thousand men, Michaud had more than enough to hold the island fortress itself. Indeed, Schill's rebels being mostly cavalry, there was little chance that Magdeburg could be taken by storm. The French commander's problem was that the populace was alarmingly pro-Schill and he was dangerously short of police. Shortly after his troops caught a local man trying to give detailed plans of the defenses to the rebels, Michaud decided that he didn't want Schill to approach any closer and thus he would send out a force to meet him.²²

The problem, though, was: which troops to send. The only forces at hand whom he really trusted were his French infantry, and their single battalion would clearly not be sufficient against the rebels. More dangerously, it would leave Magdeburg entirely in the possession of the Westphalians, of whose loyalties he could not be certain. Michaud wrote to General Eblé (the accomplished French engineer officer whom Napoleon had sent to serve as Jerome's minister of war), requesting French, Danish, or Dutch reinforcements. Finally feeling he could delay no longer, he ordered six companies of the Westphalian 1st infantry regiment and a section of artillery to march south to meet and defeat the Schill rebels. Michaud must have been nervous, however, because a few hours later he amended the order and added more Westphalians, plus two companies of his French infantry and another two guns. With this modification, Michaud wrote to the Westphalian commander, General of Brigade Leopold von Uslar, to "pay special attention to the Westphalian troops," and he emphasized that under no circumstances

were the two companies of French to be placed under Westphalian command, despite the fact that von UsLAR out-ranked his French comrade, Colonel de Wauthier.²³

At the little town of Dodendorf on 5 May the Westphalians lived up to General Michaud's low expectations of their loyalty and professionalism. UsLAR deployed them poorly, with a wooded creek running perpendicular through the midst of their line. Despite facing an enemy who was almost entirely mounted, he chose to form a single thin line. Schill's hussars broke it with their first charge. Even though their losses were very light, the Westphalian 1st Infantry disintegrated. The two French companies, who had just arrived, were left to face the rebel assault virtually alone. They put up a spirited resistance fighting from behind the church walls, ultimately retiring with heavy casualties that evening.

Michaud tried to put the best possible spin on the embarrassing "Affair of Dodendorf" in his report to Eblé. While writing that, "The Westphalian troops, who had never fired their weapons in combat before, showed much spirit and courage..." he was nonetheless forced to concede that of a force of one thousand men with four guns, "about 200 men" remained, and "a large number have dispersed throughout the region, and the rest are prisoners."²⁴ It was, in fact, even worse than that; more Westphalians had actually switched sides and joined the rebels than made it back to Magdeburg still in Jerome's employ. The only fully-formed and trained Westphalian infantry regiment in the kingdom had been mangled in about ten minutes by a group of rebels half their number. Napoleon, at least, was not fooled by the upbeat report. After hearing the news from Westphalia, he wrote an exasperated letter to his war minister, General Clarke, playing down the importance of Schill, yet grumbling about the Westphalians, "those wretched companies of conscripts," who could not be "teased out of their depots."²⁵

The remainder of Schill's revolt, which lasted until 31 May when his force was finally trapped and destroyed by thousands of Danish and Dutch troops at Stralsund, was an unmitigated string of humiliations for Jerome Bonaparte and the Westphalian civilian and military authorities. Schill's rebels plundered numerous Westphalian paymasters and local treasuries. Force was rarely required. Except for one quick-thinking treasurer who narrowly escaped an out-riding column, most of the Westphalians not only handed over the money without trouble, but actually fraternized with the rebels, gave them weapons, and in some cases excitedly cheered and/or joined them.

Jerome's police found pro-Schill broadsheets and pamphlets in Kassel, alarmingly close to the palace. At one point, acting upon a rumor that Magdeburg had already fallen, Jerome ordered his servants to begin packing.²⁶ A steady stream of reports came in from the towns of the Elbe Department. One French agent in Halle reported that the university students were leading pro-Schill demonstrations and that the townspeople were "aflame" with excitement for the rebels.²⁷ In Öbisfelde one group of *Schill'schen* was treated to a town celebration in their honor. In Quedlinburg the townspeople turned out to cheer the rebels as if watching a parade. The Prefect of Halberstadt wrote to Jerome and to Michaud assuring them of his loyalty, but then ordered the militia not to leave the city limits during daylight hours, for fear that contact with the rebels would enable the men to desert.²⁸ "The locals aren't showing any resistance anywhere," wrote one disgusted French officer.²⁹

"I can only count on these troops to a certain point," Jerome wrote to his imperial sibling. His chief of staff, General Rewbell, concurred that the Westphalians were

“totally lacking in organization.”³⁰ Napoleon stoically ignored Jerome’s distress signals and warned Marshall Kellerman not to transfer French troops from the main theatre of war on the Danube. He wrote several terse letters to his brother reminding him of the negligible size of the forces challenging the Westphalians, and expressing astonishment that Jerome could not manage the situation.³¹ Westphalia would have to make do with the forces at hand.³² Those forces — a Dutch division under General Gratien, soon supplemented by a brigade of Danes under General Ewald — proved sufficient to pursue and finally trap Schill at Stralsund by the end of the month. When the surviving rebels surrendered, several hundred former Westphalian soldiers were found among them. Indeed it is likely that Jerome’s men had fought harder for Schill than they had for their king.

The year 1809 had one more set of shocks in store for Westphalia and its young monarch. This was a particularly dangerous episode because it involved a figure from the kingdom’s recent past: Friedrich Wilhelm, the deposed Duke of Brunswick. The duke had been in exile in Austria, whence he had fled with a small retinue of loyal troops after Napoleon eliminated the Duchy of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel and deposed the House of Welfen, who had ruled for more than seven centuries. Friedrich Wilhelm blamed Napoleon not only for the destruction of his realm and birthright, but also for the death of his father upon the field of Auerstädt the previous year. He had persuaded the Austrians to equip a tiny Braunschweig contingent, whose new all-black uniform and skull-and-crossbones vengeance motif earned them the nickname, “the Black Band,” and their young leader, “The Black Duke.”

Friedrich Wilhelm’s little army numbered fewer than 2,000 men, and relatively few of them were indeed originally Brunswickers, but their existence (and *raison d’être*) attracted a number of volunteers who had an axe to grind against the Bonapartes. By the end of May the Black Band had grown, and included refugees from the Katte and Dörnberg revolts (including, briefly, both of these commanders.) As outriders for a small Austrian expeditionary corps, the Brunswickers skirmished with Saxon troops in the *Erzgebirge*. They generally had the better of these minor engagements throughout June, comprising essentially a slow and cautious invasion of Saxony. By the end of the month, their enemies included Westphalians as well: the remnants of the 1st infantry regiment, the new 6th infantry, Jerome’s Cuirassiers, and his Guards; virtually all the troops remaining to the kingdom of Westphalia that had not been sent to Spain. And to the Black Duke’s delight, he realized that Jerome himself had arrived to take personal command. The resulting comic-opera scenes of alternating debauchery, panic, and sublime bombast have been exquisitely described by John Gill. “We officers are like a herd [of cattle]....” one Westphalian lieutenant complained, “No one could tell who was actually in command.”³³

Jerome’s troops spent a month plundering the Saxons, embarrassing and angering Napoleon, and finally headed home after news of the Franco-Austrian armistice in mid-July. But the Black Duke decided that he was in no way bound by the Armistice of Znaim, and prepared instead his audacious campaign across the breadth of Westphalia.

The Black Band cut across Saxony in less than five days, entering Westphalia against seemingly hopeless odds. On 28 July they met their first obstacle, the new Westphalian 5th infantry regiment, which had marched out of the fortress of Magdeburg to stop them. The Brunswickers utterly destroyed this unit in an evening’s work. Although they had

fought with somewhat more determination and skill than their comrades had demonstrated against Schill, yet another Westphalian regiment had been vanquished by a force of rebels whom they heavily outnumbered. As before with Schill, several hundred deserted and joined the rebels.

After a triumphal reception in his home cities of Wolfenbüttel and Braunschweig, the duke pushed on to Oelper, where on 1 August he again humbled the Westphalians. The Brunswick cavalry routed the Westphalian cuirassiers without great difficulty and then scattered the 6th Infantry regiment. His route north blocked by the more reliable troops of the Grand Duchy of Berg, Friedrich Wilhelm was surprised and relieved when the Westphalian commander (Jerome's erstwhile chief-of-staff, General Rewbell) withdrew the next day and enabled him to continue his escape. Had the Westphalians been able to hold on one more day, or even conduct a fighting withdrawal, the Brunswickers would have been trapped by the arrival of Gratien's Dutch division. Although Rewbell resumed the pursuit and indeed skirmished one last time with Brunswick on the Weser, the Black Band had made good their getaway, onto British ships and into England's service for the next six years.

The Westphalian Army: Flawed from its Inception?

No portion of Jerome's army acquitted itself with distinction in 1809. The Guards served as the incubator for Dörnberg's revolt. The regular infantry ran away in the face of Schill's rebels and the Brunswickers, and many deserted. The Cuirassiers were bested by an *ad-hoc* group of Brunswick light cavalry. The militia happily cheered the enemy and handed them money and supplies and in several cases joined them. Jerome's military and civilian administrators tamped down the treasonous and ebullient celebrations for insurgents like Schill and Brunswick only with great difficulty. Why had the Westphalian military failed so badly to provide a reliable and competent defense of the kingdom against such small and isolated attackers?

Conventional wisdom holds that the Westphalians who were in Germany in 1809 were not really ready for combat, and that the better elements of the Westphalian army had been sent to Spain. This argument is problematic, however, on two levels. First, Dörnberg's revolt occurred within the Guards, supposedly the army's elite, all of whom were close to home. Schill and Brunswick also broke Westphalian units that were supposedly fully trained and equipped, like the 1st infantry and the Cuirassier regiment, in both cases despite the Westphalians substantially outnumbering their foes.

Second, the Westphalian performance in Spain could best be described as "adequate." Most of the Westphalian troops ended up at the grueling siege of Gerona. Any fair observer must concede that rather few of the French or French-allied troops or commanders in that siege had much to show for their efforts. But it is notable that out of a Westphalian force of seven battalions and two artillery companies, only 1,500 men were still with the colors by the time the starved garrison surrendered in December, and perhaps one-third that number remained by the following Spring. Whether by desertion, disease, or other forms of attrition, the Westphalians in Spain melted away without much in the way of victories (or even major battles) to show for it. Their rate of attrition (more than 80% in less than a year) reveals them to be an army not worth the substantial time

and expense spent on raising them: they died or ran away faster than they could be trained.

It is therefore not the case that the best units of the Westphalian army were simply in the wrong place at the wrong time. The Westphalians, no matter where they were sent in 1809, were inadequate to the tasks.

Alternatively, one might conclude that Westphalia had had insufficient time to prepare an effective army. The kingdom was only sixteen months old when trouble began in the Spring of 1809. But this excuse raises some obvious questions about several instances when other nations created and fielded armies in less time, and under more strenuous circumstances. Napoleonic armies could indeed be formed quickly if exigency demanded it. The Prussian and French efforts in early 1813 come to mind. The Viceroy Eugene raised an Italian army on a shoestring after the disasters in Russia. In all of these cases the troops managed to stay in the field, and usually fought well and with increasing confidence, despite having only a few months' preparation and having to organize in the midst of an ongoing war. The Westphalians had more than a year of peace, and still couldn't manage to create half a dozen reliable regiments. One might consider, for example, the transformation of the Portuguese under British tutelage between September 1809 and the Battle of Bussaco one year later. The Westphalians had as much time as the Portuguese, and a similar situation in the form of a big-power sponsor providing cadres, commanders, equipment, and brigading them with more experienced troops. Yet the steadily increasing confidence and skill of Portuguese units contrasts sharply with the Westphalian experience.

Nineteenth-century military thinkers frequently repeated earlier stereotypes about certain regions being more "warlike" than others, and thus being good recruiting areas. While today we might look at economic or social factors that made military service attractive, in the early 1800s men tended to attribute military preparedness to race or region. But no one had ever argued that places like Hanover, Prussia, Brunswick, or the Hessian duchies were too soft or "peace-loving." Indeed, their reputations for producing first-rate fighting men played a role in Napoleon's initial optimism about the utility of Westphalia. Nor had Hessians or Brunswickers ever given the impression that their loyalties were strictly local. As frequent participants in the *Soldatenhandel*, their regiments had given excellent service no matter the nationality of their ultimate paymasters, nor how far away they were sent — even across an ocean. Clearly Jerome's government possessed, in theory at least, excellent recruiting stock.

If Westphalia's poor performance was not the result of its "good" units being in Spain, nor because it lacked time, nor because it couldn't find good recruits, then we must consider the evidence that Westphalia failed to develop any national traditions that could be transmitted to the soldiery and officers. Jerome's administration failed to convince Westphalians that there was, in fact, something unique about being Westphalian. Insofar as men did not object to being part of Napoleonic France, they probably would have had no initial qualms with being under Jerome's rule. But in fact, the Bonaparte regime could not assemble anything like a critical mass of support from any of the classes or regions of this new state. Jerome and his ministers knew this, and were aware that the poor quality of the Westphalian army was directly attributable to a lack of loyalty on the part of the citizens. Consequently, in the wake of the 1809 embarrassments, the Westphalian government not only pursued the building of a larger

army; it also pursued a lengthy series of investigations of its citizens and soldiers on suspicion of treason.

The clearest indication we have that the Westphalian military performance was linked to problems of loyalty comes from the Westphalian authorities themselves. Even before the revolts and embarrassments of 1809, Jerome's ministries were worried about the evident lack of enthusiasm for the regime. Worse, they had some indication of the extent of seditious activism within the kingdom, much of which they blamed on outside influences such as the Prussian *Tugendbund*, but much of which was entirely home-grown.

The files on "Popular Unrest in Westphalia" held by the Prussian State Archive in Berlin-Dahlem are substantial.³⁴ These and the other Westphalian ministerial files contain hundreds of documents tracing the investigations Westphalian officials made of their own citizens. In dozens of cases ministers, bureaucrats, policemen, and spies all tried to tamp down the sources of popular unrest, and the military, police, and courts collected testimony about suspected deserters, saboteurs, and other treasonous individuals.

Many of these investigations reveal the insecurities of the state and regime. The cases revolve around questions such as: Who turned over the treasury to the rebels without a fight? Who allowed dozens of rebel prisoners to escape under guard? Why were these mayors and magistrates corresponding with infamous Prussian activists like Schill and Blücher just before the revolts began? Why did these local nobility allow their printing presses to be used to disseminate anti-Bonaparte leaflets? Who distributed the caricatures and nasty poems about Jerome throughout the capital? Who hid and protected the escaped rebels?

Other trials dealt with individual deserters: men who usually claimed that they had been forced to join the Katte or Schill or Dörnberg or Brunswick expeditions. Some of their arguments were laughably implausible; one man apparently traveled forty miles to find the *Schillschen* and get "forced" to join. Most of the cases, however, were opaque and came down to simple questions of accepting the accused's word. Wives pleaded for their husbands to be released, or if condemned, to be spared. Many of these cases dragged on for years. Men were still being arrested and questioned for the Katte uprising, for instance, as late as August 1813, with the sand very nearly run out of Westphalia's hourglass. One woman pleaded the innocence of her husband for three solid years, begging that he be re-instated into the Westphalian 1st infantry regiment. The lucky man was denied clemency, and thus still in prison when his regiment marched off into Russia and never returned.

If a family under suspicion had connections to the regime, they inevitably tried to use them. Jerome's "Grand-Master of the Forests" wrote to plead for mercy for a particular family who apparently had two young men under arrest for conspiracy in the Schill revolt.³⁵ In a striking case, one of Jerome's own privy-counselors, a man named Eitelwein, approached the king discretely with the news that his son had joined Schill's rebels. Hoping to help him, Jerome sent an order to Magdeburg, where hundreds of the accused were awaiting trial, to release the young man. The king received instead a sharp rebuff, reminded by one of his own ministers that the "prisoners are regarded as the property of France." Now perturbed, Jerome ordered his minister of war, Eblé, to release young Eitelwein forthwith. The general sent back the humiliating response that, "the king does not have the authority to make such a request, because His Majesty the Emperor of

the French has reserved for himself the judgment of guilt or innocence....” For the next five months Jerome tried every imaginable angle. He asked his brother and was refused. He asked his ministers and several of “his” generals to inquire on his behalf, again without result. It was more, apparently, than just a point of pride. Jerome did genuinely care about the young man’s fate, as he wrote to the Baron von Küster in March 1810 that Eitelwein “will effectively arrive, in a few days more or less, at the mercy of France, and the horrible torment of the galleys.”³⁶

If a single case can summarize the comical bathos of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Westphalia, it is surely this one. A privy-counselor’s own son joins a rebellion hoping to bring down not only the king but all Napoleonic rule in Germany. Then the powerless king, at the mercy of generals commanded by his imperial brother, can not get his own minister of war, nor any of “his” commanders, to obey his request for clemency. In the end, the king despairs at the inhumanity of the punishment awaiting the young man at the hands of imperial France, the very power to which Westphalia owed its existence.

Reform? Did the Westphalian Army Improve After 1809?

In the Summer of 1812, as they marched into Russia, the Westphalian army for the first and only time in its existence comprised a complete army-corps. The army had reached the establishment of 25,000 men that Napoleon set for it four years earlier. Indeed, it was somewhat larger than the emperor had originally envisioned since Jerome had added more light infantry, enlarged his Guard, and raised another Cuirassier regiment against his brother’s better judgment. This growth had of course been accomplished primarily through conscription. As in other regions of the Napoleonic empire, by 1812 conscription had become a plague that men avoided as best they could. Westphalia managed by various expedients, including absorbing “French” recruits from German-speaking regions that had been annexed to France. In some cases these were men who had originally been intended for French service, but whose poor attitudes and discipline convinced Napoleon that he could do without them.³⁷

Had the army improved since its humiliating debut in 1809? In some cases, the answer is clearly Yes. It is hard to find fault with the Westphalians’ performance at Borodino, although their infantry was not as heavily engaged as most other components of the *Grande Armée*. In other cases, they continued to raise eyebrows. The Westphalian VIII Corps repeatedly seemed sleepy and sluggish, more than once allowing the enemy to escape as they halted for a rest. On at least two occasions during the Autumn they were ambushed by Russian forces and lost several hundred men. Some of these embarrassments can be laid at Jerome’s feet, more still can be blamed upon their corps commander, the erratic General Junot. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Westphalians, after four years, were still not first-rate troops. Napoleon’s esteem for them is perhaps measured by the fact that he not only considered the Westphalian army as a dumping-ground for unwanted German-speaking recruits who weren’t fit for France’s regiments, but that during the 1812 campaign he twice ordered them to linger and clear off the gruesome debris of a battlefield, at both Smolensk and Borodino. Obviously the VIII Corps was not needed at the spear point of the advance.

Nonetheless, it is fair to observe that the Westphalian army that marched into Russia in 1812 was the best that Jerome’s regime ever assembled. Its total destruction in that campaign renders us unable to determine whether it would have continued to improve

and develop a level of competence and reliability comparable to the better allied contingents in Napoleon's army such as the Italians, Poles, or Württembergers. As it stands we have only the example of Borodino, in the midst of a mediocre campaign performance.

In the spring of 1813 Westphalia, along with all the other *Rheinbund* allies, struggled with Napoleon's demands to raise a new army. As elsewhere, these efforts were hobbled by strained finances, the catastrophic loss of horses, equipment, and experienced men in Russia, and the general war-weariness of the population. Protests and even riots against conscription increased sharply across Napoleonic Europe. A final, and less-tangible factor was the presence of pan-German and anti-French propaganda, which had been a steady beat emanating mostly from Prussia since 1808. Although many recent historians have dismissed such propaganda as largely ineffectual and unimportant, inflated out of all proportion by later German nationalists, in fact the correspondence of Westphalian officials demonstrates quite clearly that Jerome's government was worried about it.³⁸ Indeed, they thought they were being pro-active in their approach by arresting and interrogating anyone suspected of importing pan-German nationalist dogma from Prussia, or of spreading it within Westphalia. Letters flew between the Westphalian Foreign Ministry and their ambassadors in other German states, inquiring about "seditious writings" and their sources, but of course Jerome's government was already doing all that they could realistically do.

By the Spring of 1813, Westphalia was shot-through with raiding Cossacks and German free-corps. In what must have seemed to Jerome a cruel twist, one of his former tormentors had returned: Wilhelm von Dörnberg, now wearing the uniform of a Russian general, was guiding Chernyshev's corps across the north German plain and into Westphalia.³⁹ Amazingly, with the country about to be submerged under allied forces, and with constant reports of Westphalian civilians enthusiastically assisting the invading Russians, Jerome's police were still obsessed with that fateful summer of 1809: still making arrests, still interrogating men for involvement in the Katte, Dörnberg, and Schill revolts.

The attempt to raise a new army in 1813 succeeded primarily on paper. If many Westphalians had been unenthusiastic soldiers before, they were now positively querulous. Common soldiers were recruited much in the way that everybody else was recruited in 1813: against their will. Officers, however, had to be enticed. Jerome had relatively few enticements that he had not already offered. Westphalia already paid better than most other armies. And in 1813 the desperate shortages meant that young officers could be catapulted two or three ranks in a single promotion.⁴⁰ Surprisingly, Westphalia did raise over twenty thousand men by these expedients, but the army of 1813 had much more in common with 1809 than it did with 1812.

Westphalia was never able to reform an army corps in 1813. A few Westphalian units, when posted with French or other imperial troops, did manage to fight on. In Danzig, under the gritty and resourceful Jean Rapp, for example, the Westphalians did their part to withstand a long siege, and only began to desert long after other German-speaking troops had done so. A few battalions under the watchful eyes of Gouvion St. Cyr helped the French to man the defenses of Dresden. But the army of 1813 was largely shaky and dispirited. By Autumn, desertion had become insupportable; as in Spain in 1809, the Westphalians were melting away. The Hussars defected to Austria in late

August. The remnants of the line infantry, part of MacDonald's XI Corps at Leipzig, were disbanded after the defeat.

Conclusions

Napoleon regarded his satellite states as only marginally sovereign, and was generally intolerant of any attempt on the part of their leadership to chart a course that did not coincide with his military, political, or economic plans. This was true even if the subaltern monarch in question was a Bonaparte family member, as in the case of the hapless Louis Bonaparte in Holland. To judge these states then, is inevitably to judge them the way that Napoleon would have done — in terms of their utility to the Napoleonic cause — and by using the yardstick that Napoleon would have considered most important: military effectiveness. By these measures, Westphalia must rank near the bottom of the list of Napoleon's minor-power allies.

Westphalia ultimately produced a large army for the use of the French emperor, but its only campaign as such resulted in its total destruction within five months. The other three wars in which Westphalian troops participated give us little reason to rate them as indispensable. In Spain and in the 1813 German campaign they were adjuncts to much larger forces, and certainly not the most valuable additions to those forces. Their rates of attrition and particularly desertion were debilitating. In central Germany in 1809 they were an actual liability, even a costly embarrassment.

We can not ascribe this broad failure to poor organization, as the Westphalians followed the French model in virtually all things military, a system which produced fine armies in Poland, Holland, northern Italy, and other places. We can not ascribe it to a lack of manpower or resources, nor to the unsuitability of the population for military service, since the regions comprising Westphalia had for over a century produced excellent soldiers in the service of Hanover, Braunschweig, Prussia, and the Hessian duchies. It is difficult to ascribe it to a lack of time, since even by the 1809 campaign the Westphalians had had enough time to raise the forces which went to Spain, plus those units which fumbled so badly in Germany.

We are left, therefore, with an explanation based upon considerations of morale and *esprit du corps*. In Westphalia the people did not like their government and the government did not trust its people. The army, raised by conscription in this environment, reflected the problems of the society as a whole. Jerome's regime had no natural constituency. Half of the nobility had been dispossessed, with new aristocrats sent from France and thus loyal to Napoleon, not Jerome (as, arguably, Napoleon intended from the outset.) The peasantry was beset by higher taxation, a vigorous military conscription, and high prices resulting from shortages of things like leather and cloth (which were used up by the military and not replenished due to the Continental blockade), or tobacco and salt (which were placed under government monopolies.) The bourgeoisie, the class of inhabitants that should have been most receptive to a new, modern Bonapartist system, was plundered as thoroughly as the peasantry, saw their businesses ruined by the Continental System, and as a literate class was affected most by the strict censorship. (They were, in fact, the real targets of the pan-German propaganda movement.)

It must be emphasized that one can indeed find memoirs or other excerpts of personal remembrances, in which men express satisfaction and pride with their service in the Westphalian military. To argue that no one supported the regime or liked their service

would clearly be incorrect. King Jerome's army paid very well by German standards and offered many opportunities to men who might not otherwise have obtained rank or found employment. Nor should we discount the probable pride or excitement that some men felt at being part of an army led in person by the greatest commander of the age. For that brief time in 1812 when the Westphalians were part of Napoleon's *Grande Armée*, we do indeed note a tone of accomplishment in several memoirs.⁴¹

But it should come as no surprise that the Westphalian army – like virtually all armies – was a reflection of its state and society. The new state and its military were partially volunteer, partially conscripted; partially local, partially imported from France. The army stands as a metaphor for the uncertain nature of this new polity, and Napoleon's effort to introduce his own imperial institutions to compensate for the lack of a single set of *Westphalian* traditions. Most importantly, however, a critical mass of Westphalians at all levels of society understood the parasitical nature of Napoleon's relationship to their kingdom. Whether taking their wealth in plunder or special "contributions," or taking their bodies into an army designed to fight his wars, Napoleon used Westphalia simply as an extension of French power. Lacking any countervailing national history or traditions, lacking a government they could respect or even like, Westphalians opted not to fight very enthusiastically for Napoleon, and in many cases, not to fight at all.

Notes

- ¹ Most recently, see the essays by Andreas Fahrmeir and Jean Breuille in: Michael Rowe, ed., *Collaboration and Resistance in Napoleonic Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003); and those by Ute Planert and Michael Rowe in: Philip Dwyer and Alan Forest, eds., *Napoleon and His Empire: Europe, 1804-1814* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
- ² The Westphalian role in the 1809 campaigns, for example, comprises a chapter in John Gill's *With Eagles to Glory: Napoleon and His German Allies in the 1809 Campaign* (London: Greenhill, 1992). Among current American scholars, Michael Pavkovic has done perhaps the most detailed work on Westphalian conscription and military performance, in several papers presented at the German Studies Association, Society for Military History, and the Consortium on the Revolutionary Era. He has argued that instances of poor performance in the Westphalian military are generally the result of poor upper-echelon leadership, usually by French commanders.
- ³ The last attempt at a comprehensive monographic treatment of Westphalian history was more than a century ago: Arthur Kleinschmidt, *Geschichte des Königreichs Westfalen* (Gotha: Perthes, 1893.) The only work, in any language, attempting to chronicle all of Westphalian military history, appeared during the highly-charged atmosphere of the Nazi period: Fritz Lünsmann, *Die Armee des Königreichs Westfalen, 1807-1813* (Berlin: Leddhin, 1935.) The question of loyalty to the regime and the morale of the Westphalians in general has been addressed by two German scholars: Helmut Berding, *Napoleonische Herrschafts- und Gesellschaftspolitik im Königreich Westfalen 1807-1813* (Göttingen: 1973); and: Heinz Heitzer, *Insurrectionen zwischen Weser und Elbe: Volksbewegungen gegen die französische Fremdherrschaft im Königreich Westfalen, 1807-1813* (Berlin: Rütten & Loening, 1959.) Many recent works have appeared on Westphalian constitutionalism, as well as on the figure of King Jerome himself.
- ⁴ Napoleon's instructions (in Albert DuCasse, *Mémoires et Correspondence du Roi Jerome et de la Reine Catherine* (Paris: Dentu, 1861-68), III: 71-73) include the instructions that the younger sibling "must follow [the Constitution] judiciously" and reminding him of "the influence it can have upon your glory and mine."
- ⁵ Glenn J. Lamar, *Jerome Bonaparte* (Westport: Greenwood, 2000), 53.
- ⁶ Eckart Kleßmann, *Unter Napoleons Fahnen: Erinnerungen lippischer Soldaten aus den Feldzügen 1809-1814* (Bielefeld: Westfalen, 1991), 21-22.
- ⁷ Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz (hereafter GS-PK): V. HA Königreich Westphalen, Rep. 5 B. Nr. 37, 38, 39.
- ⁸ Heinrich Mack, "Die Finanzielle Ausbeutung des Herzogtums Braunschweig während der französischen Okkupation 1806-07" (Sonderabdruck aus dem Braunschw. Jahrbuch, 1908.)
- ⁹ The Vechelde family papers are kept by the Stadtarchiv Braunschweig (hereafter SAB): G IX 18: 15 Familie von Vechelde. Vechelde's later papers (in his subsequent career as a pan-German patriot organizing events for Napoleonic anniversaries) are in the Niedersächsisches Landesarchiv / Staatsarchiv (hereafter NSLA): VI Hs 15 Nr. 41.
- ¹⁰ Ulrike Strauß, "Die Franzosenzeit (1806-1815). In: *Technische Universität Braunschweig: Von Collegium Carolinum zur Technischen Universität, 1745-1995*. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1995): 705-706.
- ¹¹ Italics added.
- ¹² Gill, 419-420.
- ¹³ These incidents occurred in Brandenburg. For L'estocq's formal complaint to Eblé (25 September), see: GS-PK III HA, I. Nr. 524 Der Abzug des Major von Schill.
- ¹⁴ "Semi-secret" is perhaps the only way to describe the *Tugendbund*, as exemplified by Stein's "Grundartikel 18": "This organization is not secret and does not shrink from the light of day, but neither shall the members speak loudly or hastily...."
- ¹⁵ The revolts led by Emmerich (in Marburg), Martin (in Homberg), and Berner (in Wolfhagen). The degree of Tugendbund involvement in each is questionable.
- ¹⁶ Georg Bärsch lists the revolt's leaders as "Captain von Katte, Eugen and Moritz von Hirschfeld, von Tempski and other inactive Prussian officers...." See: Georg Bärsch, *Ferdinand von Schill's Zug und Tod im Jahre 1809* (Leipzig: Brockhaus, 1860), 33.
- ¹⁷ Dörnberg's recollection quoted in: Eckart Kleßmann, *Deutschland unter Napoleon in Augenzeugenberichten* (Düsseldorf: Rauch, 1965), 353.
- ¹⁸ Gill, 423.
- ¹⁹ Dörnberg escaped the failed revolt, then joined the "Black Duke" of Brunswick, thus ending up in England. From there he entered Russian service in 1812, by which time he had become a General. He

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- got his revenge in April 1813 when, leading a portion of Wittgenstein's corps, he reconquered Lüneburg. He died in 1850.
- ²⁰ Jerome's proclamation of 24 April, 1809 in: GS-PK HA III, I, Nr.523/2 "Volks-Unruhen im Königreich Westphalen." (He sent out three declarations that day: one specifically to the remainder of his Guard light infantry (those who hadn't joined Dörnberg), one to the inhabitants of the city of Kassel, and one to the whole country, as noted.)
- ²¹ Michaud's report can be found in the NSLA: VI Hs 15, Nr. 41. The 5th regiment comprised 1837 men, and the 6th had 1641. The third battalions in both cases were still forming, and would have been depot battalions, not intended to be taken into the field.
- ²² GS-PK: V HA, Rep. 6 VI, N.17: Die Unterhaltung den Blessierten Schillschen Korps, 1810.
- ²³ NSLA: VI Hs 15, Nr. 41.
- ²⁴ Ibid: Michaud to Eblé, 6 May, 1809.
- ²⁵ Napoleon to Clarke, 19 May, 1809, (Napoleon's *Correspondence* online archived by Robert Ouvrard: www.histoire-empire.org.)
- ²⁶ GS-PK: V HA, Rep. 5, B, Nr. 37, report (summary) of the rebellion, compiled on 1 August, 1809.
- ²⁷ V. HA, Rep. 5, B, Nr. 39: Betr. den Major von Schill und den Herzog von Oels, 1809-1810.
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ Bock, 168.
- ³⁰ Gill, 433.
- ³¹ See, for instance, Napoleon to Jerome, 9 June, 1809, in which the Emperor reminds the king that there are still over 4,000 Westphalian troops in the country, supported by over 18,000 other French-allied troops, against rebel forces numbering merely in the hundreds: "mere noise."
- ³² *Mémoires et Correspondance*, IV: 39, 79.
- ³³ Gill, 442-445.
- ³⁴ GS-PK HA III, I, Nr.523/2 "Volks-Unruhen im Königreich Westphalen."
- ³⁵ GS-PK: V HA Königreich Westphalen, Rep. 5 B, Nr. 38.
- ³⁶ All of these letters can be found in the GS-PK: HA III, I, Nr.523/1 Volks-Unrühigen im Königreich Westphalen. In quotes: 2 October and 14 November 1809, and 4 March, 1810.
- ³⁷ The French combed Bremen and Hamburg's prisons and poorhouses in 1811 to flesh out new French infantry regiments, but as many as half of these men ended up in Westphalian service instead. See: Jean Vidalenc, "Les départements hanséatiques et l'administrations napoléonienne," *Francia* I (1973): 449.
- ³⁸ Consider, for example: Hagemann, Karen. *Männlicher Muth und Teutsche Ehre: Nation, Militär und Geschlecht zur Zeit der Antinapoleonischen Kriege Preußens*. Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002. Or: Jörg Echternkamp, *Der Aufstieg des deutschen Nationalismus* (Frankfurt: 1998).
- ³⁹ Jerome and Dörnberg's paths crossed one more time, at Waterloo, where Jerome commanded his brother's largest infantry division and Dörnberg led a brigade of allied cavalry.
- ⁴⁰ Michael Pavkovic, "The Westphalian Army in 1813: Reforging the Palladium of Westphalian Freedom" Paper given at the German Studies Association Meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, 2 October, 2006.
- ⁴¹ The most well-known of which is probably: Friedrich Wilhelm von Loßberg, *Briefe in die Heimat geschrieben während des Feldzuges 1812 in Rußland* (Cassel: Fischer, 1844.)